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Comparative Advantage:  
The Ends and Means of Campaign Regulation 
A Response to Professor Ringhand 
DANIEL P. TOKAJI* 
Comparative election law is poised for a breakthrough. The global study of 
laws governing elections and politics has not exactly been moribund over the 
years, but it has not been especially robust either. That is particularly true in the 
United States. American election law scholars have tended to focus on U.S. 
election law, not surprisingly given the perceived exceptionalism of our speech 
law. But in an era when public faith in democracy is so imperiled around the 
world,1 the need for comparative study of election law has never been stronger. 
The laws governing campaign speech and finance are a particularly vital subject 
for analysis, given the proliferation of false and misleading information—much 
of it coming from non-domestic sources and amplified globally through digital 
media.2 Now more than at any point in the modern history of democracy, we 
must pay attention to what other democratic countries are doing to protect 
themselves from those who would seek to undermine collective self-
government.3 
Professor Lori Ringhand materially advances the comparative study of 
election law through her article, First Amendment (Un)Exceptionalism: A 
Comparative Taxonomy of Campaign Finance Reform Proposals in the United 
States and United Kingdom.4 Her discussion of reform efforts in the U.S. and 
U.K. squarely confronts the myth that the American speech tradition renders the 
comparative study of campaign law pointless.5 The article also offers a 
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 1 See Aziz Huq & Tom Ginsburg, How to Lose a Constitutional Democracy, 65 UCLA 
L. REV. 78, 78 (2018). For evidence of the worldwide decline of public faith in democracy, 
see Roberto Stefan Foa & Yascha Mounk, The Signs of Deconsolidation, 28 J. DEMOCRACY 
5, 7 (2017), and Daniel P. Tokaji, Vote Dissociation, 127 YALE L.J.F. 761, 762–63 (2018) .  
 2 See Richard L. Hasen, Deep Fakes, Bots, and Siloed Justices: American Election 
Law in a “Post-Truth” World, 36 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. (forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 23–
24), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3418427 [https://perma.cc/ 
E9XM-4CEL]; Nathaniel Persily, Can Democracy Survive the Internet?, 28 J. DEMOCRACY 
63, 63–64 (2017).  
 3 For a detailed examination of the role of courts in protecting democracy from 
authoritarianism and division, see SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF, FRAGILE DEMOCRACIES: 
CONTESTED POWER IN THE ERA ON CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS 21 (2015).  
 4 Lori A. Ringhand, First Amendment (Un)Exceptionalism: A Comparative Taxonomy 
of Campaign Finance Reform Proposals in the United States and United Kingdom, 81 OHIO 
ST. L.J. 405 (2020).  
 5 Id. at 418–19. 
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taxonomy of reform proposals that goes beyond the traditional mechanisms of 
campaign regulation,6 thus providing a helpful template for organizing future 
comparative work.  
This essay attempts to further the goals of Professor Ringhand’s article by 
considering how the comparative study of campaign regulation might be 
expanded beyond the U.S. and U.K. Part I discusses the contributions of her 
article, not only in fruitfully comparing these two countries, but also in 
providing a framework for the future study of campaign regulation. Part II steps 
back to considerations that are in the background of Professor Ringhand’s 
article, but essential to future work on the subject. It identifies the ends of 
campaign regulation that are shared by the U.S., U.K., and other democratic 
countries now under tremendous strain due to societal divisions and skepticism 
of public institutions. Part III suggests how the comparative study of campaign 
regulation might move forward, identifying three questions that are particularly 
vital to the sustenance of democracy around the world: 1) combatting digital 
disinformation, 2) strengthening electoral institutions, including those charged 
with campaign regulation, and 3) confronting the harmful effects of rising 
economic inequality on democratic governance.  
I. A TAXONOMY OF CAMPAIGN REGULATION 
There is no denying that the American free speech tradition is distinctive in 
important respects, including its libertarian orientation, skepticism of content 
discrimination, and tendency to value expressive freedom over other interests.7 
Although we are an outlier in some ways, U.S. free speech law isn’t quite as 
exceptional as is commonly supposed.8 First Amendment jurisprudence has 
never adopted the absolutist rule that anything that can be characterized as 
speech is protected, regardless of its consequences.9 To the contrary, American 
 
 6 Id. Here and throughout, I use the term “campaign regulation” to encompass both 
laws regulating election campaign-related speech (including restrictions on false and 
misleading statements), and laws regulating campaign finance. The term “regulation” is used 
in a broad sense, to include not only traditional command-and-control regulation that 
attempts to mandate or prohibit certain actions through a publicly enforceable rule, but also 
government interventions designed to influence conduct through other means. See Barak 
Orbach, What Is Regulation?, 30 YALE. J. ON REG. ONLINE 1, 3 (2012) (discussing different 
ways in which term “regulation” is used).  
 7 See ISSACHAROFF, supra note 3, at 21; Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Free Speech 
Paternalism and Free Speech Exceptionalism: Pervasive Distrust of Government and the 
Contemporary First Amendment, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 659, 660–61 (2015).  
 8 See Ringhand, supra note 4, at 407.  
 9 Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 358 (2003) (“The protections afforded by the First 
Amendment . . . are not absolute, and we have long recognized that the government may 
regulate certain categories of expression consistent with the Constitution.”); 1 RODNEY A. 
SMOLLA, SMOLLA AND NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 2:50 (2019) (“[A]bsolutism is 
fundamentally too simplistic a method of analysis to be a viable method for handling modern 
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free speech law has long recognized certain categories of expression—including 
bribery, threats, defamation, obscenity, and child pornography—that are 
unprotected or less protected.10  
As Professor Ringhand observes, the U.S. constitutional law governing 
electoral campaigns is at once exceptional and not-so-exceptional. The First 
Amendment does not prevent public entities from countering false and 
misleading speech with truthful speech. To the contrary, our tradition has long 
recognized counterspeech as the preferred antidote for such speech.11 As she 
also observes, the Supreme Court has generally been receptive to transparency 
rules that compel disclosure of campaign contributions and expenditures, even 
in Citizens United v. FEC.12 And contribution limits are permissible if closely 
drawn to the interest in preventing the appearance or reality of political 
corruption.13 This is an exception to the general First Amendment rule that 
content discrimination is subject to strict scrutiny.14 Campaign contribution 
limits are a form of content discrimination—they regulate expression based on 
its campaign-related content15—but they are not subject to strict scrutiny.16 On 
the other hand, restrictions on campaign expenditures are subject to strict 
scrutiny and may only be justified if narrowly tailored to a compelling interest.17 
 
First Amendment conflicts. Numerous judicial decisions recognize that absolutism cannot 
function as a magic talisman in First Amendment litigation, as it cannot so function in most 
arenas of constitutional law.”). 
 10 See, e.g., Ringhand, supra note 4, at 452 (describing many of the unprotected or less-
protected categories). 
 11 Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (remedy 
for false speech is “more speech, not enforced silence”).  
 12 Ringhand, supra note 4, at 439–40 (citing Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 
558 U.S. 310, 372 (2010)).  
 13 Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 387–88 (2000) (campaign 
contribution restrictions must be “closely drawn” to a “sufficiently important interest,” such 
as preventing corruption and its appearance).  
 14 See, e.g., Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2228 (2015) (“A law that is 
content based on its face is subject to strict scrutiny regardless of the government’s benign 
motive, content-neutral justification, or lack of ‘animus toward the ideas contained’ in the 
regulated speech.”); Ashutosh Bhagwat, In Defense of Content Regulation, 102 IOWA L. 
REV. 1427, 1430–36, 1439–46 (2017) (explaining how the Roberts Court has broadened and 
hardened the prohibition on content discrimination).  
 15 The lower level of constitutional scrutiny for contribution limits, relative to 
expenditure limits, derives from Buckley. Ringhand, supra note 4, at 425–26. The Buckley 
Court viewed the impingement on speech arising from contribution limits as “marginal,” 
thus warranting a more relaxed standard. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 20–23 (1976). 
Buckley nevertheless recognized that contribution limits impinge to some degree on speech, 
as well as association. Id. at 21–22. And because they restrict speech based upon its 
campaign-related content, they are properly understood as a form of content regulation. 
Under FECA, for example, a contribution to an election campaign or PAC is subject to a 
limit to which other contributions—say to a human rights or gun rights group—are not 
subject. Ringhand, supra note 4, at 413–14. 
 16 Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. at 387–88. 
 17 See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 44–45. 
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Since Buckley v. Valeo, the Court has held that promoting political equality is 
not such an interest, and therefore may not be used to justify restrictions on 
campaign finance.18 This aspect of U.S. campaign finance law is indeed 
exceptional, as other countries have recognized that restrictions on campaign 
spending are justifiable—and even necessary—to prevent wealthy interests 
from exercising undue influence.19  
Against this backdrop, Professor Ringhand’s article offers two novel 
contributions to the existing literature. The first is to identify important 
similarities between the American and British approaches to campaign 
regulation.20 She helpfully begins by noting the similar concerns surrounding 
the 2016 elections in both countries, including the influx of foreign money and 
the rise of false, misleading, and inflammatory expression spread through digital 
media.21 Both countries were targets of Russian disinformation campaigns, 
designed to spread false information, fan the flames of political polarization, 
and ultimately to undermine our democratic systems.22 As Professor Ringhand 
explains, the U.S. and U.K. approaches to this set of problems hasn’t been 
identical. The U.S. has focused more on foreign interference, the U.K. on data 
breaches, microtargeting, and campaign finance violations.23 But our two 
countries are attempting to confront the similar set of problems that emerged in 
the Brexit and U.S. presidential elections of 2016.24 After providing an 
overview of the law regulating campaign finance in the U.S. and U.K.,25 
Professor Ringhand turns to four distinct forms of campaign regulation that both 
countries have embraced.26  
This is where Professor Ringhand offers her second and most important 
contribution to the comparative study of campaign regulation: a taxonomy of 
reform proposals. Aiming to bring greater “systemic coherence to comparative 
 
 18 Id. at 48–49.  
 19 See INT’L IDEA, FUNDING OF POLITICAL PARTIES AND ELECTION CAMPAIGNS: A 
HANDBOOK ON POLITICAL FINANCE 21–22, 262–63 (Elin Falguera et al. eds., 2014), https:// 
www.idea.int/sites/default/files/publications/funding-of-political-parties-and-election-
campaigns.pdf [https://perma.cc/2K7Y-J3SS] (contrasting the U.S. with other Anglophone 
democracies); Daniel P. Tokaji, The Obliteration of Equality in American Campaign 
Finance Law: A Trans-Border Comparison, 5 J. PARLIAMENTARY & POL. L. 381, 393–94 
(2011) (contrasting the U.S. and Canada).  
 20 I use the term “British” as shorthand for the U.K., even though its territorial reach 
extends beyond the island of Britain.  
 21 Ringhand, supra note 4, at 408–10.  
 22 Larry Diamond, Russia and the Threat to Liberal Democracy: How Vladimir Putin 
Is Making the World Safe for Autocracy, ATLANTIC (Dec. 9, 2016), https://www.the 
atlantic.com/international/archive/2016/12/russia-liberal-democracy/510011/ [https:// 
perma.cc/S7PW-5HDP]; Andrew Higgins, Putin’s Russia, Punching Above Its Weight, 
Keeps Adversaries Off Balance, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 23, 2019), https://www.nytimes 
.com/2019/12/23/world/europe/russia-putin.html [https://perma.cc/R2AY-TX5B]. 
 23 Ringhand, supra note 4, at 409–10.  
 24 Id. at 410. 
 25 Id. at 410–18.  
 26 Id. at 418–62.  
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work in this area,”27 she identifies four different types of reform proposals. 
Going from least to most speech-intrusive, they are:  
1. Public education. One suggestion is to adopt measures designed to make 
voters better informed consumers of information, especially that which is 
distributed electronically.28 This might include so-called “digital literacy” 
efforts by government actors.29 As she explains, this form of public intervention 
does not face serious legal barriers in either the U.S. or U.K., both of which have 
taken modest steps in this area.30  
2. Disclosure and disclaimer requirements. Another means by which to help 
voters become better information consumers is to require candidates, political 
parties, and other groups to provide information about who is behind their 
speech.31 As she notes, the U.S. Supreme Court has looked more favorably on 
compelled disclosure and disclaimer requirements than it has on other forms of 
campaign regulation.32 But existing U.S. law leaves major gaps, exacerbated by 
the Federal Election Commission’s narrow interpretation of statutory 
requirements,33 which have given rise to the proliferation of so-called “dark 
money”—campaign spending whose ultimate source is unknown.34 Professor 
Ringhand explains that the U.K. Supreme Court (formerly the Lords of Appeal 
in the House of Lords) has taken a similarly deferential approach to disclosure 
and disclaimer, upholding them against challenge under the free expression 
requirements of the European Convention on Human Rights.35 While the U.K. 
has disclaimer requirements more extensive those applicable in the U.S., it too 
faces gaps in its transparency laws, especially with respect to social media.36 
This highlights the enormous challenges that the U.S., U.K., and other 
 
 27 Id. at 418. 
 28 Id. 421–22. 
 29 NATHANIEL PERSILY, KOFI ANNAN FOUND., THE INTERNET’S CHALLENGE TO 
DEMOCRACY: FRAMING THE PROBLEM AND ASSESSING REFORMS 7 (2019), https://storage 
.googleapis.com/kofiannanfoundation.org/2019/02/a6112278-190206_kaf_democracy 
_internet_persily_single_pages_v3.pdf [https://perma.cc/58HG-FVDS] (defining digital 
literacy as “[e]ducating users to become more discerning consumers of information and more 
skilled in understanding the platforms on which communication takes place”).  
 30 Ringhand, supra note 4, at 421–22.  
 31 Id. at 422–23. 
 32 Id. at 413.  
 33 Id. at 427–28.  
 34 Maggie Severns, Dark-Money Groups Were Ordered to Reveal Their Donors. They 
Didn’t., POLITICO, https://www.politico.com/story/2018/10/16/donors-to-dark-money-
groups-still-mostly-hidden-despite-court-ruling-905894 [https://perma.cc/7KX9-5SUL] 
(last updated Oct. 16, 2018).  
 35 Ringhand, supra note 4, at 432–33 (citing R (Animal Defenders International) v. 
Secretary of State for Culture, Media, and Sport [2008] UKHL 15, [28], [2008] 1 AC 1312 
(appeal taken from Eng.)).  
 36 Id. at 450.  
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democracies face in helping keep voters informed about the sources of 
information—including disinformation37—that they are consuming.  
3. Source Exclusions. Both the U.S. and U.K. have attempted to prohibit 
certain entities from giving or spending money to influence election 
campaigns.38 One form of source exclusion is to prohibit for-profit corporations 
from making campaign expenditures, as the U.S. did for many years before that 
ban was struck down in Citizens United,39 and as many countries still do.40 
Another form of source exclusion is to prohibit foreign governments or 
individuals from giving or spending money to influence elections. In the U.S., 
federal law has long prohibited any “foreign national”—defined to include 
foreign governments and their agents, as well as individuals who are not U.S. 
citizens or permanent residents41—from making campaign contributions or 
expenditures in any U.S. election.42 Before he was elevated to the Supreme 
Court, then-Judge Brett Kavanaugh wrote an opinion that upheld the ban on 
foreign contributions and expenditures, while narrowing it to exclude 
electioneering communications.43  
As Professor Ringhand explains, the U.K. also has a ban on foreign 
contributions, adopted as part of the Political Parties, Elections, and Referendum 
Act of 2000, though it defines “foreign” in a more nuanced way than the U.S..44 
Both countries have also experienced challenges in enforcing their restrictions 
on foreign campaign intervention. In the U.K., these concerns came to the fore 
with questionable contributions to the Leave campaign prior to the Brexit vote, 
as well as with social media advertising designed to influence the vote.45 Our 
two countries’ difficulties in figuring out who is paying for digital speech, much 
less enforcing the limits on foreign subsidization, are emblematic of the 
worldwide challenge that democracies face in attempting to cabin foreign 
influence on their elections.  
 
 37 See Dean Jackson, How Disinformation Impacts Politics and Publics, NAT’L 
ENDOWMENT FOR DEMOCRACY (May 29, 2018), https://www.ned.org/issue-brief-how-
disinformation-impacts-politics-and-publics/ [https://perma.cc/X8QK-KA9H]. 
 38 Ringhand, supra note 4, at 437–38. 
 39 Id. at 438–40. Though corporations are now allowed to make independent 
expenditures, federal law continues to prohibit corporations from making contributions in 
federal election campaigns. 52 U.S.C. § 30118(a) (2012).  
 40 See INT’L IDEA, supra note 19, at 368–91. 
 41 Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. 94-283, § 324(b), 90 
Stat. 475, 493; Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938, Pub. L. 89-486, § 1, 80 Stat. 244, 
244 (1966). 
 42 Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1976 § 324(a).  
 43 Bluman v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 800 F. Supp. 2d 281, 289–90 (D. D.C. 2011), 
aff’d, 565 U.S. 1104 (2012); see Daniel P. Tokaji, What Trump Jr. Did Was Bad, but It 
Probably Didn’t Violate Federal Campaign Finance Law, JUST SEC. (July 14, 2017), 
https://www.justsecurity.org/43116/trump-jr-bad-didnt-violate-federal-campaign-finance 
-law/ [https://perma.cc/LF3Q-MECH]. 
 44 Ringhand, supra note 4, at 442–44.  
 45 Id. at 446–47.  
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4. Content Exclusions. Restricting speech based on its content raises the 
most serious constitutional concerns, particularly in the U.S.46 Yet even here, 
there are areas where speech may be treated differently based upon its subject.  
Campaign contribution limits are an example of permissible content-based 
discrimination. The Court has long recognized that the interests in preventing 
the appearance and reality of corruption may justify closely drawn limits on the 
amount of money given to candidates and parties.47 Although there is no general 
exception to the First Amendment for false speech,48 Professor Ringhand is 
right to argue that some false and misleading statements may constitutionally be 
prohibited.49 Under New York Times v. Sullivan and its progeny, defamation of 
public officials and public figures may be proscribed, if made with “actual 
malice”—that is, with knowledge of its falsity or reckless disregard for whether 
it is true or false.50 She helpfully draws on Brown v. Hartlage, a post-Sullivan 
opinion authored by Justice Brennan, in which the Court struck down an overly 
broad restriction on campaign speech while acknowledging a compelling 
interest in preventing “demonstrable falsehoods,” and holding that the law’s 
flaw was its failure to incorporate Sullivan’s “actual malice” standard.51 This 
suggests that false campaign speech may be prohibited, if it is made with 
knowledge of its falsity or reckless disregard of whether it is true. A more recent 
example is the Supreme Court’s decision in Minnesota Voters Alliance v. 
Mansky.52 While striking down an overly broad ban on political apparel at or 
near polling places, the Court stated in a footnote: “We do not doubt that the 
State may prohibit messages intended to mislead voters about voting 
requirements and procedures.”53 This suggests that false or misleading speech 
concerning elections may be prohibited, if the ban is narrowly tailored to a 
compelling interest or satisfies Sullivan’s scienter requirement.  
Content-based restrictions are the biggest area in which U.K. and U.S. law 
diverge. Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights, as well as 
the U.K. Human Rights Act, do restrict the government’s authority to regulate 
political expression.54 But these laws don’t impose the same prohibition on 
content discrimination that is a core feature of American speech law.55 On this 
 
 46 Id. at 452. 
 47 Id. at 439–40 (discussing Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 
372 (2010)).  
 48 United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 718 (2012).  
 49 Ringhand, supra note 4, at 456. 
 50 N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964); see also Curtis Publ’g Co. v. 
Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 154–55 (1967) (extending Sullivan standard to public figures); Garrison 
v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 67–75 (1964) (extending Sullivan standard to criminal libel cases).  
 51 Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 60–62 (1982).  
 52 Minn. Voters All. v. Mansky, 138 S. Ct. 1876 (2018).  
 53 Id. at 1889 n.4. For discussion of this statement, see William Marshall, The 
Constitutionality of Campaign Deceptive Practices Acts (Jan. 10, 2020) (unpublished 
abstract) [on file with author]. 
 54 Ringhand, supra note 4, at 432–33. 
 55 Id. at 457.  
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basis, one U.K. court set aside an election result where the winning candidate 
made intentionally false statements, while another upheld the BBC’s refusal to 
broadcast an anti-abortion advertisement due to its graphic content.56 While 
limits on offensive speech go beyond what American First Amendment law 
would likely tolerate,57 there is a strong basis for defending restrictions on false 
and misleading speech under Sullivan, Brown v. Hartlage, and Mansky, at least 
where it is knowingly false or made with reckless disregard of its truth or 
falsity.58  
**** 
Professor Ringhand’s taxonomy provides a helpful framework for 
comparing campaign regulation in the U.S. and U.K., despite the significant 
differences in our free speech law. It also furnishes a promising foundation for 
comparing the regulatory regimes of other countries. But for us to move 
forward, we must first step back. Before considering the different means through 
which democratic countries regulate campaign speech and finance, we should 
take a more careful look at the underlying values that such reforms are designed 
to serve.  
II. THE ENDS OF CAMPAIGN REGULATION 
Professor Ringhand’s taxonomy of regulatory reforms offers a useful 
starting point for comparative analysis, not just of the U.S. and U.K. systems, 
but also those of other democratic countries. If election law scholars are to 
pursue such comparative work, as I think we should, then it is essential for us to 
have clear understanding of the goals of reform. This might go without 
saying, but it should not. For we cannot determine which means of campaign 
regulation work best, without a clear understanding of what its ends are. Those 
ends, moreover, may well vary from one country to another.  
My only significant concern about Professor Ringhand’s excellent article is 
that it risks conflating means and ends. The introduction to her taxonomy 
identifies four goals of reform, corresponding to the four types campaign 
regulation she discusses:  
[1] better educating the public about digital literacy (public education);  
[2] enhancing the transparency of online campaigning (transparency);  
[3] reducing the influence of foreign interests over voters’ choices (source 
exclusions), and  
 
 56 Id. at 458–60.  
 57 See, e.g., Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1765 (2017) (striking down federal law 
prohibiting disparaging trademarks); Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 592 (1969) (speech 
may not be prohibited merely because it is offensive to some listeners).  
 58 I discuss this issue in greater depth in a forthcoming essay, Daniel P. Tokaji, Truth, 
Democracy, and the Limits of Law, 64 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. (forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 
15–23) [on file with author].  
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[4] excluding deceptive or otherwise content from online distribution 
(content exclusions).59  
These are all important objectives, to be sure, but they are not the only goals 
of campaign regulation. Nor do these encompass the universe of regulatory 
means that might be pursued to achieve these ends. The remainder of this section 
identifies the main goals of campaign speech and finance regulation. This will 
set the stage for Part III, which identifies the means of campaign regulation on 
which scholars and advocates might most productively focus, with a clear eye 
on the ultimate goals of reform.  
1. Preventing Corruption. Across democratic countries, this is a universally 
shared goal of campaign finance regulation. Because this interest is so widely 
recognized, I will address it only briefly here, focusing on the way in which the 
American understanding of corruption has changed over the years.  
Since Buckley v. Valeo, the Supreme Court has recognized prevention of 
corruption and its appearance as an important interest that may justify some 
forms of campaign regulation.60 That said, the Court’s understanding of 
corruption has changed over time.61 Buckley seemed to define corruption 
narrowly, as limited to a quid pro quo exchange of campaign money for political 
favors. But in subsequent decades, the Court understood corruption more 
expansively, to include the disproportionate access and influence enjoyed by 
wealthy donors and spenders.62 The most striking example was Austin v. 
Michigan Chamber of Commerce, which understood corruption to include “the 
corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth that are 
accumulated with the help of the corporate form.”63 The Roberts Court has 
adopted a much less generous conception of corruption and a correspondingly 
stricter approach to contribution and expenditure limits. The most notorious 
example is Citizens United, which understand corruption as limited to quid pro 
quo exchanges of campaign money for officials acts.64 The anti-corruption 
rationale has thus been like an accordion, starting narrow, then widening under 
the Rehnquist Court years, only to have the air squeezed out of it in the hands 
of the Roberts Court.  
2. Informing Voters. Another interest that the Supreme Court has long 
recognized as a justification for campaign regulation is to inform the electorate. 
This interest also goes back to Buckley v. Valeo, which recognized the interest 
in an informed electorate (alongside the anti-corruption interest) as a 
 
 59 Ringhand, supra note 4, at 419–20. 
 60 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48–49 (1976). 
 61 For a longer description, see Renata E. B. Strause & Daniel P. Tokaji, Between 
Access and Influence: Building a Record for the Next Court, 9 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 179, 182–88 (2014).  
 62 See id. at 185–87.  
 63 Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 659–60 (1990).  
 64 Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 359 (2010).  
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justification for compelled disclosure requirements of the Federal Election 
Campaign Act of 1974.65  
Disclosure and disclaimer requirements are just one means through which 
voters and other citizens can be informed. As Professor Ringhand notes, public 
education of would-be voters is another means through which they can be better 
informed.66 That includes digital literacy efforts that seek to help people develop 
critical analysis skills that will help them distinguish what’s true from what’s 
false. Public and private entities might also engage in a variety of other efforts 
to limit false and misleading campaign speech.67 At one extreme is government 
censorship, but that is not the only available means of regulation, nor is it 
necessarily the most effective. The point is that false and misleading speech can 
be poisonous to democracy. That includes not only lies, but also bullshit. As 
philosopher Harry Frankfurt has explained, the difference is that a lie is a 
knowingly false statement made with a motive to deceive, while bullshit is a 
statement made with indifference to its truth or falsity with some other motive.68  
The proliferation of lies and bullshit—particularly its worldwide and 
instantaneous dissemination through digital means—is an alarming 
development.69 Bullshit is deadly to democracy, even more so than lies, because 
democracy depends on a shared commitment to truth.70 And digital 
dissemination spread through bots, trolls, and other technological means allows 
for false and misleading speech to be magnified, while making it hard to 
counteract such speech effectively. While First Amendment theory and doctrine 
have long recognized truth as essential to self-government,71 the rapid 
expansion of digital disinformation provides a grave threat to the interest in a 
well-informed citizenry.  
3. Limiting Foreign Influence. Every country has an interest in ensuring that 
its political processes are not manipulated by another country. The idea of 
democratic self-government, moreover, proposes a self—that is a polity—that 
is distinct from other governments and peoples. The Supreme Court has 
recognized this interest in holding that non-U.S. citizens may be excluded from 
activities “intimately related to the process of democratic self-government.”72 
Then-Judge Kavanaugh’s opinion for the three-judge district court in Bluman 
 
 65 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 66–68. 
 66 Ringhand, supra note 4, at 421–22.  
 67 See PERSILY, supra note 29, at 36–50. These possibilities are discussed infra Part III.  
 68 HARRY FRANKFURT, ON BULLSHIT 55, 61 (2005).  
 69 Tokaji, supra note 58, at 48. 
 70 See STEVEN LEVITSKY & DANIEL ZIBLATT, HOW DEMOCRACIES DIE 197 (2018); 
TIMOTHY SNYDER, ON TYRANNY: TWENTY LESSONS FROM THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 65–71 
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relied on this interest to uphold the longstanding federal ban on foreign 
campaign contributions and expenditures.73  
As Professor Ringhand notes, the interest in preventing foreign interference 
with elections is especially acute today, with Russian efforts to interfere in 
recent U.S. and U.K. elections.74 Russia is not the only source of such threats, 
nor are the U.S. and U.K. its only potential targets.75 None of this should be 
understood to deny that information and perspectives from foreign sources often 
enriches domestic political discourse.76 At the same time, we cannot ignore 
evidence—like that contained in the Mueller report77 and the recent bipartisan 
report of the Senate Intelligence Committee78—of deliberate attempts by a 
foreign government to undermine our democracy. These attempts sometimes 
take the form of false and misleading information, so there is a link between this 
interest and the previous ones. But not all foreign attempts at interference take 
the form of false and misleading speech; nor does all false and misleading 
speech have a foreign source. Accordingly, it is important to recognize 
informing citizens and limiting foreign influence as distinct goals of campaign 
regulation.  
4. Diminishing Polarization. A large and ever-growing body of literature 
documents the alarming rise in political polarization in the U.S. and other 
established democracies.79 While there are advantages to parties with well-
 
 73 Bluman v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 800 F. Supp. 2d 281, 287–88 (D. D.C. 2011), 
aff’d, 565 U.S. 1104 (2012). 
 74 Ringhand, supra note 4, at 408–10.  
 75 See, e.g., LARRY DIAMOND, ILL WINDS: SAVING DEMOCRACY FROM RUSSIAN RAGE, 
CHINESE AMBITION, AND AMERICAN COMPLACENCY (2019); Tim Mak, Experts Warn U.S. 
Should Prepare for Election Interference from China, NPR (Sept. 5, 2019), https://www 
.npr.org/2019/09/05/757803903/experts-warn-u-s-should-prepare-for-election-interference-
from-china [https://perma.cc/T9H7-VRVD]; Josh Rogin, China’s Efforts to Undermine 
Democracy Are Expanding Worldwide, WASH. POST (June 27, 2019), https://www 
.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2019/06/27/chinas-efforts-undermine-democracy-are-
expanding-worldwide/ [https://perma.cc/4KH7-JU9D]. 
 76 See generally Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Transborder Speech, 94 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 473 (2018); Joseph Thai, The Right to Receive Foreign Speech, 71 OKLA. L. REV. 269 
(2018). 
 77 ROBERT S. MUELLER, III, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, REPORT ON THE INVESTIGATION 
INTO RUSSIAN INTERFERENCE IN THE 2016 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION 185–88 (Mar. 2019), 
https://www.justice.gov/storage/report.pdf [https://perma.cc/F7PF-HSPL] (redacted).  
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.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Report_Volume2.pdf [https://perma 
.cc/5JRC-DMPE] (redacted). 
 79 For a small sampling of the U.S. literature, see ALAN I. ABRAMOWITZ, THE 
DISAPPEARING CENTER: ENGAGED CITIZENS, POLARIZATION, AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 
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identified positions on key issues, an overly polarized electorate can lead to 
democratic erosion.80 It can make it more difficult for opposing parties to 
compromise and create an us-versus-them mentality among different segments 
of the electorate, ultimately resulting in a loss of faith in public institutions—
and even in democracy itself.81 Fomenting such disunity appears to have been 
precisely the goal of the Russian disinformation campaign during the 2016 U.S. 
presidential election. As documented in the bipartisan report of the Senate 
Intelligence Committee, one of that campaign’s primary goals was to animate 
and mobilize U.S. citizens against one another.82 The goal was to mobilize 
opposing sides of “socially divisive issues—such as race, immigration, and 
Second Amendment rights—in an attempt to pit Americans against one another 
and against their government.”83 No group was targeted more heavily than 
African Americans, with fake social media accounts like “Blacktivist” created 
to generate millions of contacts.84 The point is not that digital communication 
is the source of partisan and racial polarization, but rather that campaign speech 
can exacerbate these divisions, ultimately impairing the project of democratic 
self-government.  
The way in which campaigns are financed can either exacerbate or 
ameliorate political polarization and its deleterious effects on democracy. There 
is increasing evidence that the American campaign finance system—in which 
less and less money flows through political parties, and more and more through 
outside groups85—is making things worse. For our report, The New Soft Money, 
Renata Strause and I interviewed political players from across the ideological 
spectrum. Most of those we interviewed, whether aligned with the Democratic 
or Republican Party, were dissatisfied with the existing system. A persistent 
complaint was the way in which the current system diminishes the role of 
political parties, especially state and local parties, relative to outside groups.86 
More recently, Ray La Raja and Brian Schaffner have empirically documented 
how the current system inadvertently favors ideologically extreme candidates, 
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 80 McCoy et al., supra note 79, at 17.  
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thus worsening political polarization.87 To be sure, there is disagreement on who 
is to blame for the U.S.’ dysfunctional system of campaign finance regulation—
Republicans blame Congress for the restrictions on party fundraising adopted as 
part of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, while Democrats blame 
the Supreme Court for Citizens United and other cases that have unleashed a 
tidal wave of outside spending. The point here is not to resolve this 
disagreement, but simply to recognize that the flow of campaign-related funding 
can affect political polarization, for better or for worse.  
5. Promoting Equality. A central principle of democracy is that it should 
accord equal consideration to the interests of all its members.88 That the strength 
of one’s political voice should not depend on one’s race or affluence is a cardinal 
principal of U.S. constitutional law. The leading example is the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, which struck down 
the poll tax on the ground that our wealth or affluence should not determine 
whether we are able to vote.89 Yet the Court had declined to extend this equality 
principle to the realm of campaign finance regulation. Buckley infamously 
declared “the concept that government may restrict the speech of some elements 
of our society in order to enhance the relative voice of others . . . wholly foreign 
to the First Amendment.”90 Since then, the Court has resisted the claim that 
equality can ever justify restrictions on campaign contributions or expenditures, 
although Austin’s expansive conception of the anti-corruption interest can be 
seen as allowing equality in through the back door.91  
Other countries have been more accepting of equality—and more 
specifically, preventing wealthy individuals and groups from exercising 
disproportionate political power—as a rationale for campaign finance 
regulation. A leading example is Canada, whose Supreme Court has embraced 
equality as a justification for limiting campaign expenditures. Harper is the 
leading case here too, but a different case of that name: Harper v. Canada, in 
which the Supreme Court of Canada upheld restrictions on third-party 
expenditures (what we in the U.S. would call independent or outside 
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spending).92 In a self-conscious repudiation of Buckley, the Court declared that 
“the State can restrict the voices which dominate the political discourse so that 
others may be heard as well.”93 Other countries likewise recognize that a core 
function of the campaign finance system is to prevent wealthy interests from 
exercising undue influence over politics.94 
There are special reasons to be concerned about the unequal effects of 
concentrated wealth on politics in the present moment. For several decades, we 
have seen a well-documented increase in economic inequality within established 
democracies.95 Although the U.S. is not alone in this respect, rising income and 
wealth inequality has been especially dramatic here. Economic inequality is 
linked to political polarization, for reasons that remain incompletely understood, 
but seem to be linked to growing public disenchantment with government 
generally.96 What’s abundantly clear from historical experience in other 
countries is that rising economic inequality poses an existential threat to 
democratic governance.97 An increasing body of social science evidence, 
moreover, documents the degree to which wealth determines political influence 
in the U.S.98 Summing up the research, Adam Bonica and his co-authors explain 
that “the rich have been able to use their resources to influence electoral, 
legislative, and regulatory processes through campaign contributions, lobbying, 
and revolving door employment of politicians and bureaucrats.”99 Though our 
campaign finance system is not the only factor contributing to rising economic 
inequality and attendant dysfunction, we must not lose sight of equality as a core 
end of our campaign finance system, notwithstanding the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
emphatic rejection of this as a legitimate democratic interest.  
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This is not intended to be an exclusive list of the goals that campaign 
regulation seeks to serve. There are other interests, like promotion of robust 
competition and protecting shareholders, that could also be advanced in support 
regulation.100 The main point is that any discussion of the means of campaign 
regulation should be grounded in an understanding of its multifarious goals, 
which are sometimes complementary and sometimes competing. This 
complicates the picture that Professor Ringhand draws. For one thing, it 
highlights other essential interests besides the ones on which she focuses (a 
point on which I have no doubt she would agree). It also suggests that there are 
often multiple regulatory means by which to pursue a goal—and that one form 
of regulation can sometimes advance multiple goals. There is not, in other 
words, a one-to-one correspondence between the means and ends of campaign 
regulation. With this in mind, I now turn to the means of campaign regulation 
that election law scholars and reformers should focus on, in the face of the 
existential threats to democratic self-government that countries around the 
world confront.  
III. THE MEANS OF CAMPAIGN REGULATION 
Having addressed the ends that campaign regulation should serve, I return 
to the means of regulation. As discussed in Part I, Professor Ringhand’s 
taxonomy organizes the means of regulation employed in the U.S. and U.K. into 
four categories: public education, transparency, source exclusions, and content 
exclusions. This is a good start, but it only begins to capture the various 
regulatory options that countries have at their disposal. To her list, we might add 
private regulation by social media and other electronic platforms,101 
public/private co-regulation through the setting of norms,102 quantity 
restrictions (i.e., limits on the amount that people may spend or contribute), 
public financing, and timing limitations (i.e., campaign periods or blackout 
periods during which electoral speech is limited).103 And the list could go on. 
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election. See Amanda Erickson, Macron’s Emails Got Hacked. Here’s Why French Voters 




60 A RESPONSE TO RINGHAND [Vol. 81  
International IDEA, for example, has developed a country-by-country table 
identifying twenty-two regulatory features on which countries differ, drawn 
from a list of forty-three questions.104  
My goal in this Response isn’t to identify and categorize all the different 
means of campaign regulation that different countries have adopted or might 
adopt. Nor is it to align these means of reform with the ends described in Part 
II, although I think that such an effort would be valuable.105 Rather my goal is 
to identify the major challenges that should be the focus of campaign regulation 
in the U.S., U.K., and other democratic countries, and to sketch out the various 
means that they might consider through which to address these challenges. I 
suggest that comparative election law scholars and reformers focus on three 
areas:  
1. Confronting digital disinformation. One of the greatest challenges facing 
democracies, both emerging and established, is the proliferation of lies and 
bullshit. Democracy depends on a shared commitment to truth. Yet we live in a 
world of false and misleading information, as well as political polarization, in 
which it has become increasingly difficult to find agreement on what is and isn’t 
true.106 Technology isn’t entirely to blame for these problems, of course, though 
it can make them worse. Government censorship of false and misleading speech 
is one regulatory approach, but it is not the only and probably not the most 
effective solution—even putting aside the formidable free speech issues. 
Professor Nate Persily has identified seven “D”s for addressing the harms of 
online speech: deletion, demotion, disclosure, delay, dilution/diversion, 
deterrence, and digital literacy.107 Professor Rick Hasen likewise suggests a 
multi-pronged approach that would include government counterspeech, 
disclosure and disclaimer requirements, and government prohibitions on 
knowingly or recklessly false speech.108 And there are other possible solutions, 
including further restrictions on campaign-related speech by foreign 
governments, which could help address both the informational and foreign 
interference issues discussed in Part II. For present purposes, the key point is 
that responding to the increasing threat posed by digital disinformation is a 
common threat facing all democratic countries. It thus provides a prime 
opportunity for comparative election law scholars, allowing countries to learn 
from each other’s experience. 
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2. Improving Electoral Institutions. Democracy depends not only on the 
rules governing the electoral process, but on the institutions responsible for 
administering and enforcing those rules. Although electoral institutions aren’t 
the main focus of Professor Ringhand’s article, it does allude in passing to the 
difficulties the Federal Election Commission has faced in recent years.109 The 
FEC routinely stalemates over all but the most routine matters, so much so that 
observers jokingly refer to it as the “Failure to Enforce Commission.”110 The 
larger lesson is that the sustenance of democracy depends on our public 
institutions, including legislative bodies, administrative agencies, and courts.111 
Comparative election law scholars should therefore devote their attention not 
only to the rules governing electoral campaigns, but also to the administrative 
and judicial entities responsible for implementing those rules.112 
3. Ensuring Equal Regard for All Citizens Regardless of Economic Status. 
The most urgent challenge that democracies across the world face is confronting 
the challenge imposed by rising economic inequality. As I have already noted, 
wealthy individuals and groups have become increasingly adept at obtaining 
what they want through the political process. Giving and spending on election 
campaigns is one means by which they do so. The most disastrous feature of 
American free speech doctrine is its refusal to recognize political equality as an 
interest that can ever justify limits on campaign spending. Although there is 
much to admire in American free speech law, this is one respect in which U.S. 
free speech law is truly exceptional—and not in a good way. The U.S. Supreme 
Court is not likely to recognize equality as a permissible end of campaign 
finance regulation, at least not as long as the current conservative majority sits. 
But this shouldn’t stop us as scholars from continuing to affirm the centrality of 
equality, embodied in America’s and Canada’s Harper decisions, to 
constitutional law. Comparative study of different countries approach to the 
shared problem of rising economic inequality, including through their campaign 
finance laws, will embolden this effort. And ultimately, we may hope to see the 
overruling of the U.S. Supreme Court’s unfortunate repudiation of equality in 
 
 109 Ringhand, supra note 4, at 423–31.  
 110 Daniel P. Tokaji, Beyond Repair: FEC Reform and Deadlock Deference, in 
DEMOCRACY BY THE PEOPLE: REFORMING CAMPAIGN FINANCE IN AMERICA 172 (Eugene D. 
Mazo & Timothy K. Kuhner eds., 2018). 
 111 See SNYDER, supra note 70, at 22 (“It is institutions that help us to preserve our 
decency. They need our help as well.”). 
 112 In prior work, I have examined and compared the institutions charged with enforcing 
campaign finance laws in the U.S., Mexico, and Canada. See generally Daniel P. Tokaji, 
Campaign Finance Regulation in North America: An Institutional Perspective, 17 ELECTION 
L.J. 188 (2018). In a forthcoming book chapter, I consider how the administrative and 
judicial institutions across countries might fruitfully be compared. See generally Daniel P. 
Tokaji, Comparative Election Administration: A Legal Perspective on Electoral Institutions, 
in Comparative Election Law (Moritz Coll. of Law, Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research 
Paper Series, Paper No. 520, 2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id 
=3500868 [on file with author].  
62 A RESPONSE TO RINGHAND [Vol. 81  
Buckley and Citizens United. Things don’t look so rosy at the moment, but we 
must not give up the fight.  
IV. CONCLUSION  
All of us who study election law should thank Professor Ringhand for 
invigorating and structuring the comparative study of campaign regulation. She 
has provided a helpful framework for analyzing the different means of 
regulation that different countries employ, that should provide the basis for 
further research in this area. She has also given us an opportunity to reconsider 
the ends of regulation. As we consider contemporary challenges, we would do 
well to consider five major objectives of campaign regulation: preventing 
corruption, informing the electorate, limiting foreign interference, diminishing 
polarization, and promoting equality. A fruitful comparison of different 
countries’ campaign finance systems can only proceed if we keep these goals in 
mind. While there are multiple means through which we might perceive these 
goals, I suggest that comparative legal scholars focus on confronting digital 
disinformation, the deterioration of electoral institutions, and spiraling 
economic inequality. Though these are dark days for democracy, they provide 
us with an ideal opportunity to advance the field of comparative election law. 
Professor Ringhand’s article provides the seeds from which many flowers might 
bloom.  
 
